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3n The spread of organized crime and its manipulation of corrupt
practices are among the strongest impediments to the development of
Southeast Europe.
n Regional instability in the past thirteen years has undermined
effective law enforcement throughout the region. It has raised
considerably the cost of regional trade, and thus the stakes of smuggling,
which consequently has become a breeding ground for organized crime
on a regional scale.
n Organized crime, particularly the type which relates to trafficking
has turned into one of the most important mechanism for unlawful
redistribution of national wealth. This slows down economic growth and
causes social deprivation.
n Further, corruption and organized crime disrupt the transition to
a market economy by destroying fair competition and the potential for
free private initiative.
n Criminal networks endanger the stability of democratic
institutions by capturing government through systemic corruption. The
impact of dirty money in politics is especially negative through the
financing of political parties and of election campaigns. This has had a
negative impact on the publics trust in the emerging democratic and
market economy institutions and has bred disillusionment with reforms
in general.
SUMMARY: THE OLD AND NEW HIGHWAYS OF CRIME IN
SOUTHEAST EUROPE
4The rule of law is the foundation for democracy, prosperity and
long-term stability. Organised crime threatens all of this. ... ... ... .
Today we therefore place this at the top of our agenda and agree on
a strategic partnership - for freedom, security and justice. In the past,
organised crime has been more organised than national and
international efforts to defeat it. We now undertake to shift the balance.
The London Statement, Defeating Organised Crime in South
Eastern Europe, Lancaster House Ministerial Conference, London,
November 2002
n One of the most dangerous forms of corruption, which
destabilizes both internal and regional security in SEE, is the symbiosis
between organized crime and representatives from the security sector
in the Balkan countries.
n The gravity of the problem calls for bold and radical measures
which should upset entrenched interests. Traditional bureaucracies - be
they national or international - cannot muster the type of public support
needed if these reforms are to be successful.
n Thus, a new type of public-private partnership is necessary to
secure public backing for the measures against organized crime and
corruption. This partnership should seek to include civil society and
private sector institutions as stakeholders in the process of prevention
and enforcement.
51. THE LINKAGES
Corruption has received much attention, particularly in the countries of
transition as it has become an accompanying phenomenon on the road
from state-socialism to market capitalism and democracy. The common
problems that post-communist societies face contribute to this fact
significantly, but there are also a number of characteristics specific to the
countries in SEE:
n Public sector operations are non-transparent, performance is poor
and trust in state institutions is low.
n The collapse of the communist regimes left behind an over-extended
public sector and high expectations in the population that it will receive
assistance in all walks of life (i.e. a premature welfare state)
n The combination of weakness, lack of transparency and
overburdening in the SEE public sectors constituted fertile ground for both
petty and large-scale corrupt practices.
n Economic reforms have been slow and countries have experienced
significant periods of reform-freeze.
These features, which originate in the recent past, however, cannot alone
explain the extraordinary scale of corrupt transactions in the new Balkan
democracies. The process of transition of state-owned economy into private
ownership through privatization, in addition to the restitution of property,
created huge opportunities for the misuse of public power. Another often
ignored sphere of systemic corruption is the de-facto privatization of cross-
border transactions through bribing state officials at the customs, border
police and other regulatory and law-enforcement bodies. Given the open
nature of the Balkan economies, cross-border transactions constitute up to
2/3 of the GDP for any single country, hence they generate even more dirty
money than privatization itself. In most of the SEE countries subordinating
state institutions to private interests, similar tendencies generally marked
the first stage of the transition-the end of 1989 and the first half of the 1990s.
The symbiosis between the state and high-risk businesses under unclear
6rules of the game and a paralysis of the judiciary bred systemic corruption.
In addition, clientelism, nepotism, and a secondary symbiosis of the
state and businesses also occur as a result of governance failures. In this
case, state interference in business affairs is much greater than the opposite
trend - buying of politicians by strong private-economic power-groups.
Some throwbacks to the past take place, which make possible excessive
government interference in the economy despite the privatization of state-
owned property. In situations like these, the opposition blames the governing
party for imposing neo-authoritarian forms of government that favor private
interests close to those in power.
Understandably, it is grand - political and systemic - rather than
administrative or petty corruption, which is the main target of anti-corruption
efforts by civil society; and it is public reforms rather than purely preventive
measures that are the most urgently needed to remedy the existing situation.
Independent monitoring and assessing of the gray zones of socially high
corruption risk, designing and recommending anti-corruption instruments
and reforms, and the lobbying for their adoption by national assemblies and
executive branches, are the main areas of civil society mission in countering
corruption.
The Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI), an
initiative of the Center for the Study of Democracy and the International
Development Law Organisation (IDLO), has been studying corruption in
the region for over three years now1  and has published the first region-wide
assessment of its spread. SELDIs analyses have highlighted the public
significance of the problem of corruption and the degree of penetration of
this phenomenon in the various social structures, institutions, and groups,
both on a comparative level, among the individual countries in the Balkans,
and in terms dynamics.
1 www.seldi.net/anti_corruption.htm
7Figure 1. Spread of corruption in SEE
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System
*    *    *
The systemic nature of corruption in SEE has become the major factor
impeding the regions development efforts. It has distorted the restructuring
of SEE economies, the modernization of their education systems and public
health care, and has affected many social programs (e.g. public housing). All
this has had a negative impact on the publics trust in the emerging
democratic and market economy institutions and has bred disillusionment
with reforms in general.
Another relevant aspect relates to the factors bringing about
corruption on such a large scale. The institutionalization of corruption in
the SEE countries cannot be explained by the national circumstances alone.
Although corruption is mostly manifested and experienced at the national
2002
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8level, a number of region-wide causes need to be taken into account if we
are to comprehend the nature of the problem.
In general, regional instability in the past thirteen years has
undermined effective law enforcement throughout the region, has raised
considerably the cost of regional trade, and thus the stakes of smuggling,
which consequently has become a breeding ground for organized crime
on a regional scale. As put by Javier Solana, EUs High Representative for
CFSP, organised crime has benefited from conflict and post-conflict
situations.2  As a consequence, one of the prevalent forms crime has taken
in the region has been trafficking, a fact acknowledged by EUs Thessaloniki
Agenda for the Western Balkans: Particular focus should be placed upon
fighting all forms of trafficking, particularly of human beings, drugs and arms,
as well as smuggling of goods.3  Driving the SEE economies into the gray,
and even criminal zone, has been the main dynamic behind high levels of
corruption. Thus, the specificity of corruption and crime in Southeast
Europe, as contrasted with other transition or post-communist countries,
lies in the cross border illegal trade, centered on the war-ridden Western
Balkans, but affecting all the countries on the peninsula.
2. THE ORIGINS
The war in former Yugoslavia and the sanctions and embargo regimes,
imposed on the warring republics (especially the sanctions imposed on the
FR Yugoslavia, which directly affected the whole region) led to proliferation
of organized crime, and especially of smuggling, trafficking and illegal trade
in SEE.
2 Intervention by Javier Solana, Defeating Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe, Lancaster House
Ministerial Conference, London, November 2002
3 The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration, EU General
Affairs Council, 16 June 2003
9In the name of the higher goals like protection of national independence
and sovereignty, the leaderships of the seceding Yugoslav republics had to
set up and arm the newly created republican armies in the only way possible
way - illegally, by using existing as well as newly established smuggling
channels. The party leaders and high-ranking figures in the Yugoslav army
and the Yugoslav secret service largely tolerated these activities and in their
turn contributed to the development of a stable smuggling system. This system
was built both vertically (from political leaders to actual smugglers) and
horizontally (it included the whole chain of smuggling channels, passing
across the new state borders and connecting through common interests the
political elites in all post-Yugoslav republics).
The elites in the Yugoslav republics were actively involved in development
and organization of smuggling channels, and they protected and assisted
those who were directly involved in their exploitation. This prosperous
business was controlled in close collaboration between politicians, their
security forces lobbies and organized crime structures. The Yugoslav
experience shows that temporary symbiosis between authorities and
organized crime during the process of creation of new states leads to
permanent transformation of state/national interests into private ones and
fosters the development of corrupt, non-transparent and crime-permeated
societies.
The free reign given to the organized crime in the war-ridden Western
Balkans, had an impact also on other countries on the peninsula. The
connection between the events in former Yugoslavia and the trans-border
crime and related corruption in the Balkans was most clearly visible during
the trade and arms embargos, imposed by the UN on the post-Yugoslav
states. The sanctions and embargos fostered the development of a regional
net of smuggling channels, with organized crime structures in Bulgaria,
Romania and Albania playing a crucial role in this process. Furthermore,
smuggling of goods under embargo to post-Yugoslav countries became an
important source of income for various groups, ranging from political leaders
to people, living in the border areas. As a result, corruption permeated law
enforcement agencies and political elites in these countries.
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Figure 2. Oil smuggling routes to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia4
4 Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, Sofia, 2002
(www.csd.bg/publications/book11/content.htm). Smuggling and customs fraud with petrol products
have a long history. Petrol products have become the most popular objects of smuggling at the beginning
of the 1990s. Preconditions for such development were created by the lifting of the state monopoly
on import, export and retail trade of petrol products (during the period 1991-1993, the number of
petrol stations has doubled). An additional catalyst for smuggling of fuel was the introduction of an
embargo on import of petrol products to Serbia and Montenegro. This has increased profits from
trade in petrol products three to four times as compared to the previous petrol consumption in the
country. Both the ordinary citizens living in border areas and the economic groups, patronized by
politicians, got engaged in fuel smuggling. The embargo on Yugoslavia was one of the most important
factors, influencing the growth of organized crime in the country. After the end of the embargo regime,
the established channels continued to operate under new conditions. This was possible because of
the subsequent political and economic crisis, privatization chaos and different prices of petrol products
in various Balkan countries. As a consequence, from mid-1990s until present, the market with petrol
products, fuels and oils remained a suitable environment for realization of illegal import, in which
criminal groups and companies, operating within the different shades of gray are involved.
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The trans-border organized crime networks, set up semi-officially with
the knowledge and often even active participation of the highest state
officials, were soon privatized by well-placed individuals and groups within
or closely connected to the ruling elites. The process of privatization was
well underway by 1992 in all SEE countries and was largely concluded by
1995 (the only exception being Kosovo where the process could be observed
between 1997 appearance of the KLA as an important regional player and
the 1999 NATO campaign). During the same period, the channels initially
established for smuggling predominantly weapons and oil were expanded
to include other goods, such as drugs, stolen vehicles, cigarettes, alcohol
and other commodities. The origins of the constantly growing Balkan trade
in human beings can also be traced to the 1992-1995 period and to the
lucrative business of assisting refugees to escape from the war zones to safety.
Thus, trans-border organized crime and corruption started to seriously
undermine the normal functioning of the states in the region.
While the regimes, which were actively engaged in development and
organization of the smuggling channels, remained in power, virtually no
attempts were made to stem trans-border crime and the corruption that
facilitated it. In Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, where
due to the specific circumstances (involvement in the war being the most
important one) the same regimes remained in power for almost the whole
decade, all the attempts to check the flow of smuggled goods were only
cosmetic, if any. In countries, where governments did change (Albania,
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania), some measures to stem proliferation of
smuggling were taken. Unfortunately, in most cases these measures were
ineffective, and led only to the change of people involved in the smuggling.
One exception to the rule may be the sweeping anti-corruption and anti-
Mafia reforms, which followed the assassination of Serbian Prime-Minister
Djindjic by former security sector officers, allied to organized crime.
The Croatian authorities justified the proliferation of smuggling and their
virtually complete inability (or unwillingness) to put an end to it with the
fact that Croatia was still engaged in the armed conflict and that more than
a third of Croatian territory was not under their control. Liberation of these
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territories was declared the absolute priority and all other issues, including
the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal trade, were
conveniently put off until some unspecified future. Little has changed after
the war ended. Many of the high ranking individuals engaged in smuggling
and other criminal activities enjoyed complete immunity from prosecution,
due to their defenders of the homeland status.
Before the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, any attempt to put an end to illegal trade was unthinkable. No
legislation, no police force, no customs services, and even no clearly defined
and recognized borders existed. Above all, there was absolutely no
willingness on the side of the authorities to tackle the problem. Trans-border
organized crime and war formed a vicious circle, in which  war generated
the need for smuggling while the profits smuggling was bringing to those
involved generated the need to prolong the war for as long as possible. After
the war, the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, which aimed above all to
preserve peace and stability in the country, created conditions in which any
serious action against organized crime and corruption was made virtually
impossible. Complicated political and administrative arrangement, division
of the country in two entities (of which the Croat-Muslim federation was
further divided into 10 cantons), as well as the more pressing issues like
post-war reconstruction, return of refugees and displaced persons, and
preservation of peace, sidetracked the fight against organized crime,
smuggling and corruption. These issues were not addressed properly until
the end of the decade.
In the FR Yugoslavia, the international sanctions presented the same excuse
the war offered to the elites engaged in illicit trade in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Efforts were made to morally justify smuggling as necessary
to help Yugoslavia survive under the unfairly imposed sanctions. While
Milosevics regime was in power, not surprisingly, no attempts were made
to counter illegal trade. Furthermore, the general public, the civil society
and the majority of opposition parties hardly ever raised the issue, despite
the fact that it was already more than clear that the only survival trans-border
organized crime made possible was the survival of Milosevics regime. The
explanation might lie in the fact that huge segments of the population were
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either directly involved in or dependent on smuggling (predominantly small-
scale or so called suitcase smuggling).
In Kosovo, The KLAs armed insurrection and the consequent clashes
between the KLA and the Yugoslav security forces destroyed any vestiges of
law and order in the province, giving the drug smugglers a completely free
reign. The alleged goal behind the drug trade continued to be the liberation
of Kosovo from the Serbian occupation while in fact it served primarily for
personal enrichment of the members of 15 clans, allegedly controlling both
the drug trade and the KLA. Prior to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
taking over the administration of the province in 1999, effectively no authority
existed which could possibly try to curb the drug traffic.
In Albania, the weak government, inadequate and non-enforced
legislation, corrupt and ill-equipped security forces and dire economic
situation all contributed to the creation of a perfect environment for
proliferation of organized crime. The involvement of the highest
representatives of the governing Democratic Party in smuggling and other
criminal activities prevented any serious action against the illicit trade before
the 1997 collapse and the subsequent change of the government. The 1997
events exacerbated the problem to such an extent that the new, Socialist
government, even if we assume that it was actually willing to do so, was
completely powerless to do anything on its own and the international
community had to step in. The most important development was the
establishment of European Commissions Customs Assistance Mission in
Albania, deployed in June 1997 on request from the new Albanian
government.
The new division of labour between the international criminal groups
in SEE outlines the increased role of Albanian and Turkish Mafiosi in heroin
trafficking, of Albanian, Macedonian, Bulgarian and Turkish criminal groups
in human beings trafficking and of Serbian and Russian/former Soviet Union
criminal groups in hired killings.
During the rule of the Party for Social Democracy (PSDR, the former
communists) in Romania, which lasted until the 1996 elections, numerous
ties were forged between some governing officials and the shadow economy
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structures. The former provided the latter with easy access to unsecured
credits from state banks (three of the main state banks were driven to the
edge of bankruptcy because of this practice), with legal blessings for their
trading monopolies, and with preferential treatment in privatization
procedures. The new Romanian business class provided their political
mentors with funds for their electoral campaigns and other, official and
unofficial, needs. In such an environment, the fact that hardly any measures
were taken to curb corruption and the gray economy, including smuggling
and trafficking, hardly comes as a surprise.
In Bulgaria the following pattern could be observed with every change of
government (the situation was very similar also in other countries):
n The electoral campaign, in which promises to fight corruption and
organized crime play an exceptionally important role, in fact intensifies the
activities of the trans-border organized crime networks, since those involved
try both to build up reserves for an uncertain future and to take advantage
of the ensuing power vacuum between the elections and the inauguration
of the new government.
n When the latter takes place, some swift and highly publicized steps
are taken - some contraband channels are broken, some of the individuals
involved (most often including some customs officers) might be dismissed
or arrested.
n The smuggling and corruption, however, are rarely significantly
affected. Rather, new people, close to the new authorities, take over the
smuggling networks.
*  *  *
15
The Yugoslav conflicts and the interweaving of political-ethnic and
criminal interests in the Western Balkans are not the only reasons for the
creation and growth of the regional criminal infrastructure, based on
permanent smuggling channels and systemic corruption. There are at least
two more important factors, which contributed to the criminalization of
trans-border traffic and the ensuing corruption.
The first is the liberalization of movement of goods and people and the
lifting of visa and other restrictions in the regional post-Communist countries.
In combination with the weakening of the state control, this has created
favorable conditions for trans-border crime. In particular, the withdrawal of
the state from strict control over the movement of people and goods across
the borders encouraged the processes of privatization of both old and the
newly-created smuggling channels. These channels were thus taken over by
the criminal and semi-criminal groups in close cooperation with former agents
of security services. State administrators, employed in key institutions like
customs, police and other services involved in border control, also got
included in the scheme through the expanding corruption networks. It can
be said that to a great extent border control passed from the hands of the
state and became an unlawfully acquired private domain of illegitimate
actors. In addition, most of the borders were not defined and mutually
recognized, and consequently properly controlled, until well into the 1990s.
Furthermore, the succession of armed conflicts and ethnic cleansing
campaigns in the former Yugoslavia led to creation of quasi-states (Kosovo
is the most obvious example of such an entity) and weak states, practically
unable to control their borders.
The second factor contributing to dynamic development of trans-border
crime and corruption during the last 12 years was the impact of one of the
main features of Balkan economies: namely, that the national borders in
this period represented the largest redistributing mechanism of national
wealth. Due to the small capacity of regional economies, the value of goods
transported to and from the Balkan countries reached up to 85% of GDP in
some cases. The losses  incurred through illegal import and export over the
last 13 years will most likely exceed the value of revenues from privatization,
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including the countries where privatization is almost completed (Bulgaria
and Croatia).
Of course, the impact of the regions geographic position should also
be considered. The Balkans has traditionally been the most important
European point of entry for the Asian heroin. During the last decade, they
also became an important distribution center for the South American cocaine.
Further, the southeast-northwest route of heroine will probably remain the
most vulnerable highway of crime. The future modernization of the
transportation infrastructure along with the European corridor „4 (Greece-
Bulgaria- Romania) and „8 (linking the Bulgarian Black sea coast to Vlora
in Albania through Macedonia) could be instrumental in the intensification
of the traffic.
The region is also the most important land route for hundreds of thousands
of illegal immigrants from Near East and Asia, who are trying to reach the
EU countries. It is also an important source, transit and even destination
region for women and girls, trafficked to be employed in the sex industry.
Southeastern Europe is also one of the most important links in the chain of
European cigarette smuggling. All these aspects represent a practically
bottomless source of corruption, mostly among border police and customs
officials, but also in the judiciary and the public administration. Furthermore,
the scale of these criminal activities also breed political corruption because
of the need for political protection of the criminal networks.
The illegal transactions, however, are not limited only to trans-border
business (import and export). Their destructive impact can be seen also in
the deformed structure of national economies, since the extraction of
enormous revenues from illicit import and export can be possible only if a
large enough gray sector exists. After the collapse of the Soviet model of
total state control over the economy, illegal transactions performed in the
gray sector came to comprise between 30 and 50 percent of the Balkan
national economies. A common practice is that those who are actively
involved in trans-border crime are also directly or indirectly involved in  trade
in the unofficial economy.
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3. THE MECHANISMS
The smuggling of goods has inflicted considerable damage to the
economies of the SEE countries. It is often accompanied by trafficking in
banned or controlled substances and items; criminal acts; competition
between the organized smuggling groups, and between traffickers and lawful
importers. Moreover, in order to stay in the market, lawful importers are
forced to resort to violations of the established foreign-trade regulations.
Trans-border organized crime has a destructive effect not only on the
economy, but also on the institutions and the rule of law in a given country.
The huge resources accumulated in this manner allow engaging in covert
financing and refinancing of various types of legal and illegal undertakings.
This is largely due to the fact that the revenues from smuggling do not enter
official government statistics; they are never declared and thus never
registered with the relevant authorities. Practice shows that all too often
proceeds from illegal trafficking serve to finance political parties, labor-union
and other organizations in SEE. Illegal import adversely affects domestic
production and harms sectors of strategic importance to the country. In its
various forms it is in fact one of the means companies employ to enter a
given market. It is also used to monopolize a certain economic or other
sector of activity - for instance the trade in alcohol, cigarettes, grain, sugar,
video and audio equipment.
The goods most frequently subject to smuggling are those with high import
tax rates (cigarettes, alcohol, motor vehicles), goods subject to national bans
and restrictions such as arms, narcotic substances and precursors,
pornographic materials, subsidized goods, protected animal species and
plants, goods and technologies of civil and military use, works of art and
objects of cultural and historical value, strategic raw materials, forged goods
and products violating intellectual property rights, goods subject to
international control, nuclear and radioactive materials, hazardous and toxic
substances and wastes, hi-tech products, etc.
Illegal import can be carried out at any time and anywhere along the
border, with the actual places of occurrence falling in two main zones -
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points where customs control is executed (ports, airports, border checkpoints,
free trade zones, and others) and points outside customs control - a remote
location along the coastline, a minor port or airport.
Depending on the nature of smuggled goods, as well as on the initial and
end buyer (destination), citizens of different states are engaged as
perpetrators. In a number of cases the citizenship of the person used for the
smuggling is of great significance insofar as there are visa restrictions on the
movement of persons and goods in certain regions of the world - for instance,
the Schengen Agreement. Illegal trade with a final destination in a Schengen
country usually involves nationals of these countries, or persons frequently
traveling to these countries.
*  *  *
Below, cross border organized trafficking mechanisms in Bulgaria are
exemplified.
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Type of goods
1. Petrol products
2. Household appliances
3. Electronics (chips, plates,
etc)
4. Airplane cargo
5. Turkish goods (not
counting
food products)
6. Chinese and other Asian
goods
7. Consumer goods from
Dubai
8. Fruit and vegetables
9. Meat and poultry
10. Milk powder
11. Rice, beans, lentils
Origin, route
Romania - Ruse.
Varna - Lesport Neftohim
Thessalonika - Kulata -
internal customs bureaus
USA, EU - airport Sofia
China, Dubai - airport Sofia
Turkey (Istanbul) - Kapitan
Andreevo - internal customs
bureaus; Istanbul - free zones
- internal customs bureaus
- Plovdiv, Haskovo
China, Vietnam, India, etc.
Thessalonika - Kulata - internal
customs bureaus; Thessalonika
- Novo Selo - Plovdiv - Kazanluk;
Varna
Dubai - customs free zone Syria -
Svilengrad - internal bureaus Sofia,
Plovdiv
Turkey, Syria, Macedonia -
clearance
in Svilengrad, Zlatarevo, Sofia
Thessalonika - Kulata - Sofia;
EU - Vidin - Sofia;
EU - Kalotina - Sofia;
Black Sea ports.
Ukraine, Russia - Ruse, Kardam
Varna
10-20,000- ton ships
Bribes
100,000 leva per barge
(3,000 - 5,000 tons)
Roughly 10,000 leva
per truck
30% of unpaid VAT
1.5 leva / kg
Kapitan Andreevo -
500 leva;
internal customs bureau -
1,000 leva
Border crossing - 500 leva;
Internal customs bureau -
1,500 leva for trucks with canvas
coverage;  2,000 leva for
3 containers (2 trucks)
Border crossings - 500 leva;
Internal customs bureaus -
1,500 leva
1,000 leva on average, divided among
customs, sanitary control, police, traffic
police, hygiene-epidemiology institute,
regional bureau for combating
organized crime
Border crossings + veterinary controls
- 800-1000 leva;Internal bureau -
2500-3000 leva for customs officials
+ 500-1000 leva for veterinary control
4,000 leva per truck
$19-20,000 per ship
Quantity/value of smuggled goods
30-35% of general
consumption
20 trucks per month
$ 3-5 million
40-100 tons monthly
150 trucks per month
200 containers per month on average
200 trucks per month
240 trucks between October and
May  and 20 trucks from Syria
250 refrigerator trucks per month
2 ships loaded with rice per month
Type of fraud
Export declarations from
Romania;Part of the cargo is
hidden
They are taxed as different
goods
Shipping agents are
involved in smuggling
Untrue weight is declared;
false receipts; false origin
certificates; free zone
Svilengrad; precise quantity
and type of goods is not
specified in documents, but
only the number of boxes
Considerable discrepancies in
weight quoted in documents
and in reality. False certificates
of origin (Turkish).
False origin certificates (mostly
Turkish); transported in trucks
with canvas coverage.
Transportation of poultry and
meat instead of vegetables in
some trucks.
Producer is not indicated on
the trucks; false certificates,
false EU export declarations
False certificates from Poland;
pure profit $10-12,000 per
truck
Part of cargo is hidden;
concealed origin;
Table 1. Smuggling according to the types of goods5
11 Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, pp.16-17
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Petrol products are the most important contraband items in this country.
According to official data of Bulgarias Customs Agency, 350 tons of liquid
fuel enters the country every day. The smuggling of petrol products, as well
as the number of various forms of customs violations and fiscal offences
connected to it, has substantially decreased in the last three-four years. Yet,
experts analyzing the current situation believe that 30 to 35 percent of general
consumption in Bulgaria is still gray or even black.6
Illegal import of petrol products, fuels and oils therefore generates the
largest losses to the state budget. If we compare data for legally imported
petrol products for the last three years, substantial differences can be
observed.
According to the operative data from the customs statistics, there was an
unprecedented drop in the petrol import in the first six months of 2002,
although there was no registered drop in the consumption on the internal
market in this same period (table 2).
Table 2. Comparison of the value of imported petrol products (in
Bulgarian leva) by quarter
Source: Bulgarian Customs Agency
1999 2000 2001 2002
Petrol products - 27,217,097 34,183,808 58,311,141 16 ,018 ,630
first quarter
Petrol products - 24,481,056 81,991,287 52,973,198 25 ,541 ,868
second quarter
Petrol products - 51,698,1531 116,175,095 111,284,339 41,560,498
half year period
6 According to independent sources within the customs administration, budget losses come to around
500,000 leva daily as a consequence of that.
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The official explanation is that the drop is the result of the fall of the
value of US dollar (the value of fuels is measured in dollars, unlike the value
of other goods, which is measured in euros). The second reason given was
that Naftex, a major importer, has suspended its imports.
Another widespread phenomenon is smuggling of automobiles. Unlike
most of the other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria does not have its
own car production and is completely dependent on import. According to
statistical data, the import could conditionally be divided into two categories
- import of new and import of used cars. Data from operative customs
statistics show that the market for used cars is valued at 250-300 million leva
in 2001. The value of the annual market of new cars ranges from 200 to 250
million leva. The overall car market in the country therefore reaches around
500 million leva annually and is one of the largest in Bulgaria (1.69% of
GDP in 2001).
New cars represent only 10 percent of the overall number of cars sold in
Bulgaria in the last 12 years (between 12,000 and 14,000 new automobiles
are sold annually). There are almost no customs violations involving the
import of new cars. One reason for this is the control, exercised by large car
companies over their distributors networks and logistics, and the second is
the control the Bulgarian companies involved in import of new cars practice
over their competitors. Due to the small size of the market in terms of number
of imported vehicles, such companies can follow every sale made by the
competition.
The situation regarding the import of used cars is very different. The data
shows that in the last 10 years, more than one million cars were imported,
with an average annual import of about 100,000 cars in the last three years.
Used cars therefore occupy the central place on the Bulgarian car market.
The used cars market is well developed, with companies specialized in
particular types and classes of cars, with permanent partners all over the
world, with specialized transport facilities, with numerous service-stations
and with an exclusive right on a particular part of the country. Despite the
lack of systemized information, it is obvious that the market is large enough
for the big importers (100-300 cars annually), medium-sized importers (30-
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40 cars) and for private persons, importing 2-3 cars a year.
Liberalization of the import of used cars has created a gigantic gray market
for spare parts and accessories for the cars (it represents 70-80 percent of
the overall market). With 100,000 used cars imported annually and with the
enormous gray import of spare parts, it is not a problem for a specialized
criminal group to conceal up to 20,000 cars, stolen within the country or in
some other European state. Bribes between 2,500 and 3,000 leva (depending
on the type of the car) are paid to customs and border police officials in
Kapitan Andreevo. Usually, the person driving the stolen car is registered as
a passenger, transiting the border on foot or in some other transport vehicle,
and the car itself is not registered at all.
Cigarettes represent perhaps the most popular item for smuggling due to
their specific features (small size, high price, very large consumption),
cigarettes are the most popular item for smuggling not only in Bulgaria, but
also in most of the world. The profits made by the cigarette smugglers are
close to those, made by the drug smugglers. The volume of cigarette
smuggling in Bulgaria can be most accurately determined if the data from
customs statistics are compared with the data from marketing research on
the sales of imported cigarettes in the country. According to the latter, the
annual cigarette market in the country can be estimated at 500-560 million
leva.7  Imported cigarettes represent 12-15 percent of all cigarettes sold (60-
80 million leva).
Based on these estimates, CSD experts calculated that in 1999, less than
10 percent of imported cigarettes, sold in Bulgaria, were legally imported.
In the period 2000-2001, the share of legally imported cigarettes sharply
increased, although consumption remained unchanged. However, legally
imported cigarettes still represent only 30 percent of foreign cigarettes, sold
in the country.
Several factors have influenced this development. Among the most
important is the new approach of the large multi-national companies. Few
7 The estimate of the National Statistical Institute is lower - 260-280 million leva annually.
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of them planned to participate in the privatization of the Bulgarian tobacco
giant Bulgartabak and as a consequence, they tried to legalize their
products, sold in the country. The change in the behavior is also a result of
many international law suits against them on charges that the multinationals
assist the smuggling of their products. Equally important is that the Bulgarian
law-enforcing agencies intensified their efforts in countering cigarette
smuggling.
A new situation occurred in early 2002. A clearly visible drop in revenues
from cigarette imports has occurred as compared with the same period in
the previous two years (see table 3).
Table 3. Comparison of the value of cigarette imports (in Bulgarian
leva) by quarter
Source: Bulgarian Customs Agency
These changes could be connected with the retreat of the multi-national
companies from privatization of Bulgartabak, as well as to the increase of
the excise tax in the beginning of the year. The fact that the situation within
the customs has calmed down has also enabled corrupt officials to
reactivate the traditional smuggling channels. Certain part of the increase of
the share of smuggled foreign brands on the market is also a result of the
higher price of Bulgarian cigarettes. Similar reasons are also behind the fictive
export of Bulgarian cigarettes through Kapitan Andreevo, where bribes of
about 15,000 USD are paid for every truck, carrying 900-960 master boxes
of cigarettes.
*  *  *
1999 2000 2001 2002
Cigarettes - first quarter 47,579 92,723 350,535 424,575
Cigarettes - second quarter 653,212 1,187,044 1,350,195 577,065
Cigarettes - first half-year 700,791 1,279,767 1,700,730 1,001,640
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4. THE CONSEQUENCES
From the second half of the nineties, organized crime has undertaken
the following steps towards its integration into SEE business and politics:
n through privatization, control of imports and exports, racketeering,
establishing monopolies in a number of the most profitable economic sectors,
etc.
n redistribution of profits(import and export of raw materials and
commodities, wholesale of agricultural and industrial production, financial
institutions, tourism, etc.).
n control over the black economy (revenues from petty crime, car
theft, drug trafficking and drug distribution, prostitution, human trafficking,
counterfeiting of money and securities, etc.).
n venturing into new methods for financial crime (cyber crime, credit
card fraud, etc.)
n creation of durable corruption networks through redistribution of
dirty money among the lobbies of organized crime in government structures.
Those methods sketch the outline of the economy of crime as a quasi-
economic system, which combines legal with illegal and criminal methods
and forms of business, and which is to a great extent protected from law
enforcement.
The threat posed by this infiltration is increased because of the fact that
often regional societies and governments in one way or another tolerate the
economy of crime as it is deemed different from traditional criminal activity.
State institutions and law enforcement continue to show certain tolerance
to the big players in the shadow and the criminal business. A number of
laws are not enforced making it necessary to introduce new regulations
although their effectiveness remains questionable as well. The inefficiency
of the judicial system has an especially destructive effect on the efforts for
counteracting the economy of crime, which is only partly due to imperfect
legislation. In practice, not only does organized crime remain unpunished,
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but it also uses the judiciary to eliminate competitors through corruption.
In his speech to the London Conference on Organized Crime in SEE, EU
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten pointed out that crime and
corruption are a social, political and economic problem.8  In particular, the
absence of adequate measures against the economy of crime has a number
of negative impacts:
n Deepening of the socio-economic problems of transition by the
draining of public resources.
n Undermining the transition to a market economy by destroying fair
competition, the potential for free private initiative and consequently pushing
honest business players out of the market.
n Redistribution of national wealth through corrupt privatization,
financial and tax fraud, trafficking and resulting import monopolies, etc.
n Participation in international corruption and criminal networks
through which the region is integrated in international criminal infrastructure.
n Creation of a negative image of the region among foreign business
and political partners, which creates obstacles for its integration in the
European Union and NATO.
n State capture with the resulting risk for the stability of democratic
institutions.
n The impact of dirty money in politics is especially negative through
the financing of political parties and of election campaigns.
8 Speech by The Rt Hon Chris Patter, CH, Defeating Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe,
Lancaster House Ministerial Conference, London, November 2002
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5. THE SOLUTIONS: INNOVATING FOR SECURITY
As has become obvious by now, traditional security risks related to armed
conflict in SEE have given rise to new, softer versions based on the spread of
organized crime and governance failures caused by systemic corruption.
Hot conflicts are being supplanted by the gradual erosion of sovereignty
of public institutions over key aspects of social and economic life in the
region - Javier Solana called it a predatory system. Most importantly, these
result in undermined human development efforts and diminished chances
for EU and NATO integration.
The international community and local reform-minded opinion makers
in SEE provided indispensable leadership and vision in overcoming the
conflicts in the early and mid 1990s in the region. Since the gravest current
threats are fluid and flexible, and their effects become evident only over
time, similar leadership and vision is needed from international and regional
actors.
The gravity of the problem calls for bold and radical measures which
should upset entrenched interests. For this to happen, broad public coalitions
need to be formed both within countries, and region-wide. Traditional
bureaucracies - be they national or international - cannot muster the type of
public support needed if these reforms are to be successful. And public
support is a must in confronting a phenomenon with such broad social and
economic consequences. Currently, SEE societies are not sufficiently engaged
in changing the permissive environment that allows crime to operate freely.
Thus, being effective against the new challenges to the security and reforms
in SEE is preconditioned on the departure from the traditional state-oriented
thinking. Where crime makes inroads into development through corruption
is where governance failures could be redressed through public-private
partnerships - neither public governance structures nor the private sector
could do it alone. A new type of public-private partnership is necessary
to secure public support for the measures against organized crime and
corruption. This partnership should seek to include civil society and
private sector institutions as stakeholders in the process of prevention
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and enforcement.
Broadening the scope of stakeholders in responding to crime and
corruption in SEE has a number of advantages:
n Flexibility will be added to the prevention and enforcement
mechanisms. One of the difficulties in combating modern criminal networks
is that law enforcement bureaucracies are pitted against adaptable and
innovative structures.
n Civil society organizations are much less attractive for criminals to
capture and will thus infuse integrity in the process.
n Private sector and civil society institutions could provide
sustainability and long term approach as they are not bound by the election
cycle limits of governments and political parties.
n The available expertise will be enhanced (e.g. in areas such as forensic
accounting, threat assessment and analysis, etc).
Finally, becoming aware of the true dimensions of regional trans-border
crime and of its impact on regional corruption patterns requires that a
comprehensive approach be adopted. For now, the regional approach in
counteracting trans-border crime and corruption is still overshadowed by
individual national efforts, which are further fragmented by the artificial
division on challenges to internal security on one side, and external security
of a particular country on the other.
